A Note on Constructing SIDH-PoK-based Signatures after Castryck-Decru Attack

In spite of the wave of devastating attacks on SIDH, started by Castryck-Decru (Eurocrypt 2023), there is still interest in constructing quantum secure SIDH Proofs of Knowledge (PoKs). For instance, SIDH PoKs for the Fixed Degree Relation, aim to prove the knowledge of a fixed degree d isogeny ω between the elliptic curve E0 and the public keys E1, E2. In such cases, the public keys consist of only the elliptic curves (without image of auxiliary points), which suggests that the Castryck- Decru-like attack does not apply these scenarios. In this paper we focus on the SIDH proof of knowledge of De Feo, Dobson, Galbraith, and Zobernig (Asiacrypt 2022); more precisely, we focus on their first 3-special soundness construction. In this work, we explicitly describe an optimized recoverable Σ-protocol based on their 3-special soundness SIDH-PoK. We also analyze the impact of building a signature scheme based on the optimized protocol and study the impact of moving to B-SIDH and G2SIDH setups, on the signature sizes

Applying Castryck-Decru Attack on the Masked Torsion Point Images SIDH variant

This paper illustrates that masking the torsion point images does not guarantee Castryck-Decru attack does not apply. Our experiments over SIDH primes hint that any square root concerning the Weil pairing on the masked public key helps to recover Bob\u27s private key via the Castryck-Decru attack

Optimal strategies for CSIDH

Since its proposal in Asiacrypt 2018, the commutative isogeny-based key exchange protocol (CSIDH) has spurred considerable attention to improving its performance and re-evaluating its classical and quantum security guarantees. In this paper we discuss how the optimal strategies employed by the Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) key agreement protocol can be naturally extended to CSIDH. Furthermore, we report a software library that achieves moderate but noticeable performance speedups when compared against state-of-the-art implementations of CSIDH-512, which is the most popular CSIDH instantiation. We also report an estimated number of field operations for larger instantiations of this protocol, namely, CSIDH-1024 and CSIDH-1792

Lattice Isomorphism as a Group Action and Hard Problems on Quadratic Forms

Group actions have been used as a foundation in Public-key Cryptography to provide a framework for hard problems and assumptions. In this work we formalize the Lattice Isomorphism Problem (LIP) within the context of cryptographic group actions. We show that a quadratic number of queries to a randomized oracle outputting LIP instances sharing the same secret is enough for inverting the group action in polynomial time. We use this result to uncover a family of weak isomorphisms and to derive two new hard problems equivalent to LIP for quadratic forms with trivial automorphism group

SIDH-sign: an efficient SIDH PoK-based signature

We analyze and implement the SIDH PoK-based construction from De Feo, Dobson, Galbraith, and Zobernig. We improve the SIDH-PoK built-in functions to allow an efficient constant-time implementation. After that, we combine it with Fiat-Shamir transform to get an SIDH PoK-based signature scheme that we short label as SIDH-sign. We suggest SIDH-sign-p377, SIDH-sign-p546, and SIDH-sign-p697 as instances that provide security compared to NIST L1, L3, and L5. To the best of our knowledge, the three proposed instances provide the best performance among digital signature schemes based on isogenies

Karatsuba-based square-root Vélu’s formulas applied to two isogeny-based protocols

At a combined computational expense of about $6{\ell}$ field operations, Vélu\u27s formulas are used to construct and evaluate degree-$\ell$ isogenies in the vast majority of isogeny-based cryptographic schemes. By adapting to Vélu\u27s formulas a baby-step giant-step approach, Bernstein, De Feo, Leroux, and Smith presented a procedure that can computes isogeny operations at a reduced cost of just $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{\ell})$ field operations. In this paper, we present a concrete computational analysis of these novel procedure along with several algorithmic tricks that helped us to further decrease its computational cost. We also report an optimized Python3-code implementation of several instantiations of two isogeny-based key-exchange protocols, namely, CSIDH and B-SIDH. Our software library uses a combination of the modified Vélu\u27s formulas and an adaptation of the optimal strategies commonly used in the SIDH/SIKE protocols to produce significant speedups. Compared to a traditional Vélu constant-time implementation of CSIDH, our experimental results report a saving of 5.357\%, 13.68\% and 25.938\% base field operations for CSIDH-512, CSIDH-1024, and CSIDH-1792, respectively. Additionally, we present the first optimized implementation of B-SIDH ever reported in the open literature

Computing Quotient Groups of Smooth Order with Applications to Isogenies over Higher-Dimensional Abelian Varieties

There is an increasing interest in efficiently computing isogenies with a kernel of large-smooth size, for instance, as a building block for building secure Proof-of-Knowledge (PoK) with isogenies of degree equals a power of a small prime number. Another example corresponded to the attacks started by Castryck and Decru and followed up by Maino-Martindale and Robert, which require calculating isogenies over superspecial principally polarized abelian surfaces (superspecial PPAS). On the opposite side of cryptanalysis, some of the current state-of-the-art on safe isogeny-based PoK constructions extends to the case of superspecial PPAS, with the property that one could use smaller fields (e.g., 128, 192, and 256 bits). This work presents a general framework that generalizes the situation of computing isogenies of the large-smooth degree to the context of quotient groups. More precisely, we abstract and propose a generalization of the strategy technique by Jao, De Feo, and Plût. Such a framework provides an efficient generic algorithm that easily applies to computing isogenies over superspecial PPAS when given the isogeny kernel. Additionally, our algorithm induces an efficient algorithm to perform the KernelToIsogeny procedure required in SQISignHD. To illustrate the impact of optimal strategies, we draft our experiments on the isogenies over superspecial PPAS required in the Castryck-Decru attack (powers of two and three). Our experiments illustrate a decent speed up of 1.25x faster than the state-of-the-art (about 20% of savings). Our results should be viewed as proof-of-concept implementation and considered for optimized C-language implementations

Low Memory Attacks on Small Key CSIDH

Despite recent breakthrough results in attacking SIDH, the CSIDH protocol remains a secure post-quantum key exchange protocol with appealing properties. However, for obtaining efficient CSIDH instantiations one has to resort to small secret keys. In this work, we provide novel methods to analyze small key CSIDH, thereby introducing the representation method ---that has been successfully applied for attacking small secret keys in code- and lattice-based schemes--- also to the isogeny-based world. We use the recently introduced Restricted Effective Group Actions ($\mathsf{REGA}$) to illustrate the analogy between CSIDH and Diffie-Hellman key exchange. This framework allows us to introduce a $\mathsf{REGA}\text{-}\mathsf{DLOG}$ problem as a level of abstraction to computing isogenies between elliptic curves, analogous to the classic discrete logarithm problem. This in turn allows us to study $\mathsf{REGA}\text{-}\mathsf{DLOG}$ with ternary key spaces such as $\{-1, 0, 1\}^n, \{0,1,2\}^n$ and $\{-2,0,2\}^n$, which lead to especially efficient, recently proposed CSIDH instantiations. The best classic attack on these key spaces is a Meet-in-the-Middle algorithm that runs in time $3^{0.5 n}$, using also $3^{0.5 n}$ memory. We first show that $\mathsf{REGA}\text{-}\mathsf{DLOG}$ with ternary key spaces $\{0,1,2\}^n$ or $\{-2,0,2\}^n$ can be reduced to the ternary key space $\{-1,0,1\}^n$. We further provide a heuristic time-memory tradeoff for $\mathsf{REGA}\text{-}\mathsf{DLOG}$ with keyspace $\{-1,0,1\}^n$ based on Parallel Collision Search with memory requirement $M$ that under standard heuristics runs in time $3^{0.75 n}/M^{0.5}$ for all $M \leq 3^{n/2}$. We then use the representation technique to heuristically improve to $3^{0.675n}/M^{0.5}$ for all $M \leq 3^{0.22 n}$, and further provide more efficient time-memory tradeoffs for all $M \leq 3^{n/2}$. Although we focus in this work on $\mathsf{REGA}\text{-}\mathsf{DLOG}$ with ternary key spaces for showing its efficacy in providing attractive time-memory tradeoffs, we also show how to use our framework to analyze larger key spaces $\{-m, \ldots, m\}^n$ with $m = 2,3$

RYDE: A Digital Signature Scheme based on Rank-Syndrome-Decoding Problem with MPCitH Paradigm

We present a signature scheme based on the Syndrome-Decoding problem in rank metric. It is a construction from multi-party computation (MPC), using a MPC protocol which is a slight improvement of the linearized-polynomial protocol used in [Fen22], allowing to obtain a zero-knowledge proof thanks to the MPCitH paradigm. We design two different zero-knowledge proofs exploiting this paradigm: the first, which reaches the lower communication costs, relies on additive secret sharings and uses the hypercube technique [AMGH+22]; and the second relies on low-threshold linear secret sharings as proposed in [FR22]. These proofs of knowledge are transformed into signature schemes thanks to the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86].Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:2307.0857

Faulty isogenies: a new kind of leakage

In SIDH and SIKE protocols, public keys are defined over quadratic extensions of prime fields. We present in this work a projective invariant property characterizing affine Montgomery curves defined over prime fields. We then force a secret 3-isogeny chain to repeatedly pass through a curve defined over a prime field in order to exploit the new property and inject zeros in the A-coefficient of an intermediate curve to successfully recover the isogeny chain one step at a time. Our results introduce a new kind of fault attacks applicable to SIDH and SIKE